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BOOK REVIEWS
Economic methodology for policy guidance
How economics should be done, by David Colander and Huei-chun Su, Edward Elgar,
2018, $40.00, pp 270+ xxvi, Cheltenham UK, ISBN 978-178897992-4
Where economics went wrong, by David Colander and Craig Freedman, Princeton
University Press, 2019, $27.95, pp 267 + xii, Princeton NJ, ISBN 978-0-691-17920-9
Before reading two recent books of which David Colander is first author, I had thought of him as a
unique gadfly who has been the best promoter of three loosely connected strands of work. He has
done insider-informed sociology of economic ideas that is happily unencumbered by ponderous
sociological theory. He has empirically studied, and kept the profession well briefed on, patterns
in the professional and intellectual formation and attitudes of apprentice economists. And he has
promoted the application of complexity theory in macroeconomics. Now, thanks to these new
books, I appreciate that these three activities are unified by a distinctive methodological perspective,
and that, importantly, my description of the third strand above isn’t quite accurate. Henceforth I’ll
say: Colander is the best example of an economic methodologist who seriously aims to help econ-
omists increase the effectiveness of their influence on society and policy. What I mean by ‘best’ here
is that he is the one most likely to actually enjoy some success in this ambition. This is for two main
reasons. First, he is sympathetic to the aims that most economists actually have, instead of wishing
they would try to do something else. Second, he does not ask economists to think with imported
concepts they would have to struggle to integrate into their standard thinking kit.
Though unified in their themes and implications, the two books are very different from one
another, and, for reasons I will explain, in their sophistication and depth. The Colander and Su
volume is a collection of Colander’s papers, some co-authored, published in various journals and col-
lections between 1987 and 2016. Su curated them into topic clusters and provides an introduction
that ties them together. None of the older essays have become out-dated, which partly reflects how
little other methodological literature has addressed Colander’s issues of concern. The Colander and
Freedman book is a sketch of one strand of the history of what they regard as a major mis-step in the
evolution of economic method, the same mis-step that is the recurrent focus of attention in the
essays in Colander and Su. As I will explain later, the historical strand in question presents the
reader with a distractingly oblique view of the main problem. I will argue that it might lead
readers who do not acquaint themselves with the much broader vision presented in the Elgar
volume to underestimate the significance and scope of Colander’s critique. There are likely to be
many such readers, because the Princeton volume is shorter, written in simple, non-technical
language, and distributed by a publisher with wider reach than Elgar. I likely would have had a some-
what negative view of it had I not read the Colander and Su collection first.
I will focus first on the deeper book. Colander’s core methodological thesis is stated clearly in Su’s
introduction, and re-stated in several of the papers in the collection. This reiteration is useful, serving
to make clear what is foundational and what is derived in Colander’s portfolio of opinions. So I will
summarise the foundation.
According to Colander, economic science seeks to discover universal, or at least highly persistent
and pervasive, relationships among economic states and processes. It does this by means of math-
ematical modelling. For optimal progress, the more sophisticated the math the better, and so theor-
etical economists should be students of new developments in mathematics – and also, for the sake
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of econometrics, in statistics. But because of its universalistic ambitions and mathematical method,
economic science is necessarily highly abstract. This equips it poorly as a tool for generating policy
advice, because policies are always implemented under special local circumstances in which major
causal effects are generated by (i) infrequent contingencies and correlations amongst economic vari-
ables themselves, (ii) exogenous political, social, cultural, geographic, demographic, technological,
and institutional peculiarities that resist specification and identification of tight priors, and (iii) stra-
tegic feedback from agents with imperfect knowledge, heterogeneous utility functions, and limited
information-processing resources, especially time. Policy is typically centrally concerned with active
short-run coordination, in time and space, of choices that do not need such deliberate management
in the long-run modelled by abstract theory. To give an example of my own: quantitative easing (QE)
by central banks after 2008 should have no effect on asset values in the long run because sophisti-
cated traders who can use derivatives to spread risk across the time horizon are at least as capable of
forecasting bond yields as the monetary authorities, and have the informational advantage of
knowing their own coefficients of intertemporal risk aversion. But QE, first in the US and a few
years later in the EU, probably twice prevented a world depression because most actual businesses
cannot survive temporary demand crashes or credit stops on the basis of expected future liquidity.
Colander’s heroes in the history of economic methodology, who are called ‘Classical’ in Colander
and Su and ‘Classical Liberal’ in Colander and Freedman (about which more later) knew that econ-
omic science is not designed to directly yield policy advice. They resisted the ‘vice’ of the errant
outlier in their own ranks, Ricardo. A bit awkwardly for Colander’s history, two of the heroes, J.S.
Mill and Nassau Senior, failed to follow their own advice when they took real-time positions on
responses to the Irish famine. It is true, however, that Mill recognised, at least when he was philoso-
phising instead of trying to improve the work ethics of the Irish, the limited practical power of
abstract theory. And Colander’s most regularly quoted wise man, John Neville Keynes, was explicit
that economic policy formation is an ‘art’, meaning that its success depends on discerning ethical
and political judgment and accumulated weight of experience, rather than a ‘science’ in the sense
of boiling down to mathematical generalisations that can be relied upon regardless of circum-
stances. Keynes’s son, the most influential producer of policies among economists after Smith and
Marx, was equally trenchant and more rhetorically inventive in stressing the same point. In this
clarity, Keynes the younger also benefited from the influence of his teacher Marshall, who favoured
modelling ‘one thing at a time’ to general equilibrium reasoning because, to actual business strate-
gists, the former is a sensible choice input and the latter isn’t. Colander’s final frequently quoted
advocate of a firewall between economic science and the art of economic policy guidance is
Lionel Robbins.
What disrupted this sound picture, according to Colander, was the rise of technical welfare econ-
omics and the emphasis on optimal control specification. This body of theory directly drew foun-
dations for normative economics from general equilibrium theory. Colander emphasises that the
hubris incorporated in and encouraged by this ambition was smelled out quite quickly by econom-
ists themselves. He approvingly cites Graaff’s (1957) conclusion, at the end of his elegant consolida-
tion of formal welfare theory, that the ‘possibility of building a useful and interesting theory of
welfare economics… is exceedingly small’ (p. 169). Over the six decades since Graaff’s book, econ-
omists have tolerated a kind of institutional schizophrenia about welfare theory. On the one hand,
endorsement of sentiments such as Graaff’s have been widespread and frequent, and on occasions
the sub-field has been pronounced ‘dead’ (on grounds critically reviewed by Fleurbaey & Mongin,
2005). On the other hand, the core theory has been continuously retrofitted and refined within
the many branches of applied policy economics, such as international trade theory, development,
transport, health, and labour economics. Defense of this state of affairs typically appeals to pragma-
tism: policy choices must be made, and if they are not to be driven by ideologies, then even flawed
economic theory is surely a better basis than nothing. As Colander and many others have noted, this
somewhat forlorn justification is not consistent with the levels of confidence with which economists
typically offer normative advice.
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Colander points out that what is meant by ‘advice’ here itself needs scrutiny. As Sugden (2018)
has also recently argued, the ‘policy recommendations’ sections dutifully constructed near the
ends of journal articles are seldom addressed to actual agents who commissioned the advice, or
who could possibly implement it. I will give an example from my immediate professional experience
in developing economically sound prioritisation of the South African roads budget (Ross & Town-
shend, 2021). Most work on this topic by other economists has aimed to identify the optimal pro-
portions of national investment and expenditure for roads. I have no evidence that this work has
had any influence on policy choice, because in South Africa as in all democracies there is no
agent who has discretion to allocate the national budget on the basis of effects on the national
economy conceived through general equilibrium representation. Budgets result from political
horse trading shaped by the relative power of cabinet departments and interest group lobbies.
Actual decision makers, roads authorities at various administrative levels, have occasionally
sought and used economists’ advice on how to invest the budgets they’re given, and there is cur-
rently a nascent attempt underway to generalise such local-level consultation by Townshend and
me, under the coordinating guidance of the National Roads Agency. Crucially, this effort is premised
on the fact that our models are not abstract, but take account of relationships between idiosyncratic
local conditions and types of pavement surfaces at a granular scale, i.e. discriminating not just
between sealed or gravel, but among 11 different seals. Our task is to prioritise roads for resealing,
constrained by a set of policy targets. Colander refers to this sort of role for the economist as ‘general
contracting’. It does not involve neglect of economic theory. If it did, why would an economist be
consulted in the first place? But theory is used for building checklists of economic relations to be
studied, and for identifying opportunity costs and variables that accountants and engineers aren’t
trained to estimate, such as local shadow prices of unskilled labour for maintenance of such surfaces
as don’t require high-tech methods.
Among recent commentators on methodology, this theme is not unique to Colander and his co-
authors. Eight decades ago J.M. Keynes (1936) urged economists to refrain from promoting sweep-
ing normative programmes and to adopt the posture of ‘humble, competent people, on a level with
dentists’ (p. 373). Leamer (2012) argues that because economists’ collective allocation of effort to
problems has its primary source in policy challenges, economics is a ‘craft’ rather than a ‘science’.
His main focus of attention is on how the Heckscher-Ohlin (H–O) family of international trade
models, which clearly does not literally describe actual trade flows between any countries, can be
used in assessing prospective trade agreements for risks of Stolper-Samuelson effects on domestic
wages. This depends, Leamer argues, on the economist’s crafty judgment, honed from experience,
about the H–Omodel’s pragmatic diagnostics, as well as about effect sizes that cannot be econome-
trically estimated on the basis of a model that isn’t ‘true’. Finally Duflo (2017) sketches a role for
development economists as ‘plumbers’. By this she refers to the value of attention to local-scale fea-
tures that accommodate or resist installation of a policy, as opposed to just its intended inputs and
desired outputs. This plumbing role corresponds particularly closely to Colander’s ‘general contract-
ing’. However, Duflo does not follow Colander – or Keynes – in urging humbleness upon economists,
because she thinks that while some economists engage in plumbing, other economists (‘engineers’)
should be entrusted with formal mechanism design and still others (‘scientists’) should develop and
test relevant generalisations. Duflo’s conception of economic science emphasises a specific form of
model-free experimentation. As with other promoters of randomised control trials who think that
this methodology is recommended because it ‘lets the data speak’, she attributes less value to struc-
tural economic theory than Colander does. Thus full positioning of the ‘randomistas’ within Colan-
der’s critical framework is complicated, and warrants special attention elsewhere.
I turn now to another topic that looms large in the volumes under review, special problems
around macroeconomics. Colander and his co-authors share the widespread disenchantment with
macroeconomics that accords dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) the status of core
model. The strongest arguments for dethroning it echo Romer’s (2016) critique, which is cited
several times in the more recent of the papers in Colander and Su. The main sources of rot in
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DSGE according to Romer are that it stuffs what matters most to macroeconomic causality into the
black box of ‘exogenous shocks’ (see Leamer and Shinde [2021] for a more extended discussion of
this general problem), and relies for apparent empirical sensitivity on ultimately spurious ‘calibration’
procedures. Citations to Romer notwithstanding, however, Colander mainly quarrels with DSGE-
based macro as a specific example of his more general target, overly abstract modelling used to
directly derive policy selection. DSGE is particularly vulnerable to this attack because, unlike avow-
edly foundational theories such as Arrow-Debreu GE, the intended point of DSGE is to isolate effects
of variables that can be manipulated by monetary policy authorities. The strongest available defenses
of DSGE concede this point. The basic DSGEmodel is invariably customised to reflect country-specific
factors and histories by central banks that use it for forecasting and guidance, notwithstanding the
obvious consequent risk of over-fitting. By similar logic, DSGE modellers have responded to the
failure of most macroeconomists to anticipate the 2008 financial crisis by bolting effects of
financial fluctuations onto the core model that assigns no role to money. This response can be
defended against charges of being ad hoc precisely by emphasising the status of macroeconomics
as a form of policy engineering rather than disinterested science. Arguably, prior to the Great Reces-
sion central banks saw their objective as being largely restricted to control of inflation. Within this
restriction, what macroeconomic models were asked to forecast were rates of medium-term
growth and ratios of aggregate investment to aggregate savings and aggregate consumption. A
case can be made, based on trends measured before the COVID-19 singularity, that they were
doing this successfully even in 2007. (Of course, these variables moved far from their trend lines
in the short run, prior to recovery after 2011.) Then, the defense continues, central banks extended
their mandates into fiscal policy by engaging in quantitative easing; so the scope of DSGE-based
modelling was likewise extended to incorporate traditional fiscal policy variables. Thus modelling
choices followed derived demand for policy advice. Whether someone finds this response persuasive
or not, its logic positively embraces the kind of direct theory to policy relationship that Colander
attacks.
Colander and co-authors don’t engage with these sorts of details on how DSGE modelling is insti-
tutionally implemented. They implicitly assume that the policy goal of all macroeconomics must be
reducing business cycle amplitude. Of course this assumption is fully warranted where the origins of
macroeconomics are concerned, and Colander’s astute paper on the nature of economists’ contri-
bution to pre-2008 policy and forecasting failure, which is among the best chapters in Colander
and Su, takes a long historical approach. However, when Colander goes on in the next chapter to
promote cointegrated vector auto regression (CVAR) as a superior and distinctively ‘European’
alternative to DSGE, the absence of attention, at least within the covers of the book, to the details
of DSGE-inspired policy guidance leaves him vulnerable to the following line of argument. Overly
general DSGE models, without situational bolt-ons and incorporating maximum-strength rational
expectations, are indeed inferior to carefully constructed CVAR modelling as policy tools. Arguably,
however, ‘standard’ CVAR models have been insufficiently sensitive to modest interpretations of
rational expectations of the kind discussed by Ragot (2012). Colander complains that European
macroeconomists have been failing to adequately hold their line and have shown increasing
signs of surrendering to the hegemony of DSGE. But as applied DSGE modellers abandon purity
and bolt on financial and contextual sidecars, they effectively converge their approach with those
CVAR modellers who recognise that the Lucas critique may be over-stated but should not be
ignored. There is tension in praising CVAR for its flexibility, on the one hand, and worrying that its
‘true spirit’ is being diluted, on the other hand.
I referred in opening this review to my somewhat mistaken prior image of Colander as an advo-
cate of applying complexity theory in economics. There are many such advocates (e.g. Albin, 1998;
Anderson et al., 1988; Arthur et al., 1997; Blume & Durlauf, 2006; Ormerod, 1998), and few main-
stream economists regard their contributions as fringe heterodoxy. (Arrow’s presence among the
complexity advocates would make such dismissal implausible all by itself.) However, as Colander
acknowledges, their impact on economic theory and on policy has been slight. Many commentators
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explain this with rhetoric about ‘early days’ of a new technology. But the earliest source I cited above
was published thirty-three years ago. Colander emphasises a different view, grounded in his general
methodological critique. Economics based on complexity theory is still theory, and as such should
not be directly applied to policy. One might think that a complex-systems model of an economic
process is closer to the context-sensitive level where Colander thinks that normative economists
should live if it is based on simulation of that specific process and either incorporates or represents
its institutional idiosyncrasies. But this is not always or necessarily true – standard applied economics
abounds with country-specific and firm-specific models – and Colander does not lay much stress on
the point. What he more interestingly argues is that it is the economy itself that is complex, in the
sense of being dynamical and non-ergodic, and this interferes with the direct applicability of any
theory, including theory about complex systems, for normative guidance. Of course Colander
believes that models which themselves include dynamics and avoid assuming ergodicity are likely
to better fit data, all else being equal, than models that don’t. So he is strongly sympathetic to
increased investment, especially by younger economists, in complexity-based economic theory
and in multi-agent modelling that breaks as radically as possible with representative agent restric-
tions. But he also recognises the validity in objections that generality is among the aims of good
theory, whereas methodology based on simulation struggles to achieve this. Colander’s advocacy
of a strong ‘firewall’ (his recurrent phrase) between theoretical and artful economics forms a
barrier in both directions, thus blocking simple and sweeping inferences such as ‘good policy for
a complex system should best be informed by theoretical models that are themselves complex’.
On the other hand, it is hard to argue with the idea that if the macroeconomy is complex and dyna-
mical then a model that doesn’t represent the complexity and permits only comparative-statics
analysis is likely to miss important patterns, no matter how clever and innovative the econometric
compensations.
My own opinion is that economists should study complex-systems models as a search method for
finding potentially interesting patterns, but should not base forecasts on them in advance of having
much better confidence than is currently warranted about which elements that could be simulated
are most informative, conditional on identified structural variables such as relative elasticities in
factor markets. Colander might, for all I can tell, agree with this, subject to the caveat that we
should not use theory alone to generate forecasts for policy guidance in the first place. And I
think he is right about that, his central point. Where macroeconomics is concerned, I came to Colan-
der and Su already persuaded of their conclusion by the example of Leamer (2009), the most satisfy-
ing book on macroeconomic policy I know.
I said at the outset that the Colander and Freedman volume is a less nutritious intellectual meal
than Colander and Su, and furthermore that I would advise no student to read Colander and Freed-
man unless they’d read Colander and Su first. I’ll now explain these judgments.
Colander and Freedman is a historical narrative intended to explain, in part, why and how econ-
omists forgot the good advice of Mill, Marshall, Robbins, and the two Keyneses. Its greatest value lies
in the fact that it is based partly on interviews with participants in key debates. Annoyingly, there is
no list of these interviewees, but based on the text they at least included Gary Becker, Ronald Coase,
Aaron Director, Milton Friedman, Rose Friedman, James Kindahl, Sherwin Rosen, and Paul Samuel-
son. Of course, given the timelines of these individuals, most of the interviews occurred some
years ago. The reader will note the dominance of Chicago economists in this list, and that reflects
the primary conceit of the narrative, which may strike many readers as eccentric.
Here is the story plot, with apologies to Colander and Freedman for the inevitability of making it
look less nuanced and informative than it really is by boiling it down to bare bones. The play has
three main acts.
In Act I, at the dawn of the post-war world, leading economic theorists inherited a dominant tra-
dition with two features: it had been ‘Classical Liberal’ and it had been skeptical about deriving policy
from technical analysis, and especially from mathematical analysis (as opposed to insight from dia-
grams and technical stories). Colander and Freedman’s point in referring to their heroes gallery, the
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same wise historical methodologists who are honoured throughout Colander and Su, as ‘Classical
Liberals’ is that although they did not deny that governments should play active roles in fostering
and maintaining civil society, they thought that social efficiency was generally best served by
letting markets allocate most resources based on price signals. As Marshall argued explicitly, a
greater burden of argument rests with a proponent of a new public intervention to regulate com-
merce. So they were economic liberals.
Act II stars Samuelson. After both theoretical and policy anticipations in the 1930s, the Classical
Liberalism of Act I came under pressure as theorists, primarily those associated with the Cowles Com-
mission and leading East Coast schools, especially Harvard and MIT, developed the technical econ-
omics of optimal control. This involved stapling together, though without genuine connecting
foundations, the model of a boundlessly rational agent (an individual, a firm, or a household) with
Hicksian (IS/LM) macroeconomics. The great Arrow-Debreu result was viewed as confirmation of
the efficiency of markets, but in principle efficient general equilibrium allocations could be
brought about by a planner with power to effect lump-sum transfers at least as well as by indepen-
dent participants coordinated only by prices. The logic of control implied direct determination of
policy from theory; and because the content of the theory in question had to be precise, all proposed
elements of it had to be represented mathematically. An implication was that makers of economic
policy should have no room in their toolkits for imprecise concepts from qualitative social theories or
everyday politics and culture.
In Act III the Economics Department at Chicago, following a period of ambivalence in the immedi-
ate postwar years, acquired a distinctive intellectual mission under the leadership of Director, Stigler,
and Friedman to be the bastion of resistance against ‘Saltwater’ indifference to the avowedly essen-
tial role of free markets in promoting efficiency and prosperity. Colander and Freedman argue that
the Chicago School might have – and should have – stemmed the tide by preserving the Classical
Liberalism exemplified by their leader in the previous generation, Frank Knight. Indeed, Colander
and Freedman further maintain, they could have reinvigorated Classical Liberalism in a distinctive
way had they brought Buchanan’s understanding of public choice, and especially Coase’s view of
transaction costs as unavoidable barriers to general equilibrium reasoning as a policy recipe, into
their tent. But none of these things happened. Buchanan’s recognition that government officials
are agents within the economy rather than its external choreographers was latched, under Tullock’s
influence, to axiomatic rational choice theory. Coase’s insight was turned upside down by Stigler and
marketed to economists as Coase’s Theorem, stating that where transaction costs are removed, as
they are in general equilibrium, market regulation is pointless since agents will bargain to
efficiency. Most importantly, Friedman (1953) in the most influential methodological essay of the
postwar era, argued that apparent policy disagreements among economists mainly stemmed
from confusions about the role of counterfactual assumptions in economic theory, and that if this
mistake was avoided then the content of economics could consist entirely of a positive science of
efficiency. According to Chicago, the central message of that science for policy makers is that
they should protect legal property entitlements and otherwise leave almost all other domestic
policy questions to be settled by market dynamics. One could of course fill a decent-sized library
with criticism of this libertarian (or ‘neo-liberal’) mantra. Colander and Freedman’s fire is directed
instead at the methodological context in which Friedman and his colleagues grounded its
defense: the view that economic science can be used to directly resolve policy controversies.
Colander and Freedman don’t explain why they chose to defend their Classical Liberal view by
focusing on those who they think should have saved it from eclipse, the Chicago gang, rather
than on those who played the principal role in displacing it to begin with, the ‘saltwater’ economists
of optimal control. (Compare, by contrast, a recent book that has much in common with Colander
and Freedman’s critique, but which I found more enlightening, Mirowski and Nik-Khah [2017].)
One possible reason is that it was indeed Friedman, not Samuelson (and certainly not Arrow),
who went to the trouble of explicitly arguing, in exact contraposition to Colander and Freedman’s
central thesis, that normative policy disagreements can and should be directly resolved by appeal
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to results from positive economic theory. But then the reader might reasonably want to know from
the historians what Samuelson, Arrow, Baumol, Phelps, and other more representative voices on
methodology thought about Friedman’s, 1953 essay. Colander and Freedman’s subtitle is Where
Economics Went Wrong. If the literal intended reference of this phrase is to Chicago, this suggests
acceptance of that School’s conceit that it represented the main core of the discipline. The
Chicago economists were remarkable advertisers, and managed to convince much of the policy
establishment that their views were the default principles of mainstream economists. But this was
never true.
In this context it is also worth remembering that the majority of person hours that academic econ-
omists (as opposed to non-academic economists working for financial companies or governments or
public agencies) devote to policy consulting are microeconomists’ hours. Much of this consulting
builds real, functioning mechanisms. I am thinking here of unbiquitous features of the fixed econ-
omic environment such as dynamic pricing algorithms, public asset and service auctions, tax com-
pliance incentives, matching algorithms, and public health queuing rules. The majority of this
work is applied game theory. When Colander and Freedman occasionally mention game-theoretic
modelling – for example, in their invocation of Ariel Rubinstein and Alvin Roth as contemporary
expressers of the Classical Liberal ethos – they suggest that it avoids their central criticism. As refer-
ence to Rubinstein and Roth suggests, Colander and Freedman also seem to exclude experimental
economists from inclusion among those who have ‘gone wrong’. In my experience, experimental
labs tend far more to derive the problems that inspire their designs from policy challenges than
from abstract theory. And what about mechanism designers? What about Duflo’s ‘plumbers’?
Coyle (2007) devotes most of her book on the contemporary ‘soul of economics’ to these activities.
In general, it seems that where Colander and his co-authors talk about ‘economics’ gone adrift, they
really mean: applied general-equilibrium economics and macroeconomics.
I have concentrated on criticisms. This should not obscure the point that the Colander and Su
volume is enlightening and engrossing, is for the most part persuasive and sensible, and is richer
than the sum of its parts. Colander and Freedman is a useful though somewhat slight extension
to the historical dimension of Colander’s critique.
I have long thought that economic methodologists and philosophers of economics have neg-
lected the consulting side – consulting under real commissions, that is – of the profession. Closer
attention to this would allow us to give more closely informed answers to questions that Colander
and his co-authors raise. How does use of theoretical models vary when one passes from client-
directed to open-ended policy framing? To what extent does consulting experience reflect back
into economists’more curiosity-driven modelling? As far as I know these things haven’t been exam-
ined. It is a mark of methodological reflection far from the herd, such as Colander’s, that new matters
for investigation come into focus.
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